Is this what anti-Hegelianism looks like?

Bergson explains that there are two ways of determining what colors have in common.  Either we extract the abstract and general idea of color, and we do so by “effacing from red what makes it red, from blue what makes it blue, and from green what makes it green”: then we are left with a concept which is a genre, and many objects for one concept.  The concept and the object are two things, and the relation of the object to the concept is one of subsumption.  Thus we get no farther than spatial distinctions, a state of difference that is external to the thing.  Or we send the colors through a convergent lense that concentrates them on the same point: what we have then is “pure white light,” the very light that “makes the differences come out between the shades.”  So, the different colors are no longer objects under a concept, but nuances or degrees of the concept itself.  Degrees of difference itself, and not differences of degree.  The relation is no longer one of subsumption, but one of participation.  White light is still a universal, but a concrete universal, which gives us an understanding of the particular because it is the far end of the particular.  Because things have become nuances or degrees of the concept, the concept itself has become a thing.  It is a universal thing, if you like, since the objects look like so many degrees, but a concrete thing, not a genus or a generality.  Properly speaking, there is no longer many objects for one concept; the concept is identical to the thing itself.

Deleuze, Gilles. “The Concept of Difference in Bergson” (1956) Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2004 43. Print.

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